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Five hundred years ago, the explorer John Cabot returned from the waters around 
what is now Newfoundland and reported that codfish ran so thick you could 
catch them by hanging wicker baskets over a ship’s side. Cabot had discovered a 
resource that would change England forever, the basis of a maritime trade that 
would give that tiny island kingdom the wealth, skills and shipbuilding capacity 
which would transform it into a global empire. He had discovered the most 
fantastic fishing grounds the world had ever seen, waters so teeming with life that 
a vast swath of the new world was colonized just to harvest its seemingly 
limitless bounty (Woodward 2001, pp. 34-39). 
 
The fishing industry is one of the oldest in Canada, initiating trade primarily with  
Britain when Europeans first came to Canadian shores. The fisheries played an important 
role in the development of Canada’s economy being one of the first bulk staples products 
exported from Canadian shores. The Canadian fisheries have been an increasing concern 
in recent years, however, not so much for the contribution they now make to the 
Canadian economy (which is small), but for the environmental and conservation costs 
that have been paid within the fisheries industry and communities as exploitation of fish 
stocks using mechanized harvesting techniques has pushed many fish stocks, not only 
cod, to historically low levels. How to reverse these trends in a mature staples industry, 
and how to manage a sustainable fishery is an increasing concern and priority not only in 
Canada, but also in international fora.1 While the impacts and costs of fisheries decline is 
felt domestically, in the modern era fisheries management has become much more of an 
international concern. Given the ability of harvesters from many countries to (over-
)exploit many species either in international waters or as they  migrate through domestic 
oceans, it is increasingly various international fora and organizations that provide the 
analyses that establish and illustrate the critical link between economic, environmental, 
cultural, political and social values and variables in fisheries policy.  
All the natural resource sectors are subject to various notable influences, 
including trade liberalization, globalization and transnational organizations (Wellstead). 
Institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), as “the only global 
organization dealing with the rules of trade between nations,”2 hope to work in tandem 
with other NGOs and IGOs in the interest of securing sustainable and economically 
successful fisheries. The ways in which these influences impact fisheries is dependent 
upon the nature of the governmental structures and regimes that govern the fisheries 
within each state, and how the fisheries relate to these various institutions, as well as how 
natural resource sectors and governments relate to external institutions (such as trade 
liberalization institutions like the World Trade Organization). These relationships change 
over time, and are particularly relevant when examining the emergence of new economic 
sectors amongst the traditional sectors, or rather the shifts between traditional staples 
economies to new post-staples economies.  It is the relationship between these influences, 
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particularly the trade liberalization pursued by the Ricardian state in this sector of 
economic activity, that will be the focus of this article. 
 
 
The Fisheries as Staples Industries 
As Wellstead set out in his article, a staple is essentially a primary sector 
“building block” in natural resource based economies. It is a raw or unfinished 
commodity such as timber or fish which is sold on the market with little to no processing 
(Hessing and Howlett, 1997). Staples economy theory, developed by Harold A. Innis, is a 
theory based on the  Canadian experience as a new settler society with a vast resource 
base. The theory argues that the development of Canada’s economy was strongly linked 
to its natural resources, driven by global demand for these resources, or rather, subject to 
the external pressures of global demand (ibid; Laxer, 1985). The pressures of external 
demand created a centre-periphery relationship, whereby the external forces represent the 
metropole or centre which determines the development of the periphery, in this case 
Canada’s, economy.  
There has always, therefore been a major, international, focus to staples 
theory(Laxer, 1985). So much so, that staples theory has sometimes been interpreted so 
as to take Canada “off the hook”, so to speak, regarding its own responsibility for its 
economic development. As Marchak has argued: 
 
 “(When staples theory is) applied to Canada, underdevelopment was due not to 
entrepreneurial weakness, cultural deficiencies, or lack of aggregate demand, but 
to the combination of control of internal surplus by a national bourgeoisie 
unconcerned with national industrial development, and the market demands and 
constraints imposed by Britain and, subsequently, the United States” (Marchak, 
1985: 676).  
 
The development of the Canadian economy, however, as Gordon Laxer has 
argued, cannot be solely attributed to policy emanating from metropolitan countries. This 
echoes the view of Mel Watkins when he stated “Staple economies are often believed to 
be more at the mercy of destiny than they actually are” (Watkins, 1967: 63 in Laxer, 
1985). That Canada has been heavily reliant upon its natural resources is not matter of 
dispute, but who has controlled the development of this resource-based economy is the 
centre of this debate. Has Canadian internal policy been responsible for the creation of 
this staples state, or has it been the power of external forces, or metropolitan countries 
such as Britain and the United States? The dynamics between internal and external forces 
on the Canadian economy is particularly relevant when looking at the fishery. Here, the 
relationships between Canadian and “metropolitan” policy come to the fore as 
international agreements concerning trade in general and fisheries management is 
specific, represent the negotiated settlements between states regarding what they will 
trade and under what conditions.  
 This article highlights the developments in the Canadian fisheries, examining 
some of the problems experienced by the Canadian fishing industry, and in what ways the 
Canadian fishing industry has been impacted by trade liberalization and trade agreements 
such as the NAFTA and the WTO. The purpose of this article is to discuss where, 
particularly, the Canadian fisheries stand in relation to the changing Canadian economy 
from a staples to a post-staples economy, and how this relationship in turn is affected by 
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The Status of the Current Canadian Fishery 
As Hutton (1994) has discussed, Canada is arguably moving from a staples to a 
post-staples political economy, at least insofar as a number of the dominant provinces 
such as Quebec and Ontario have left natural resources behind as fundamental features of 
their economic development. Even provinces such as British Columbia that have been 
traditionally labeled as staples economies are demonstrating much more complex 
economies whereby manufacturing, particularly in electronics and communication, now 
by far outstrips growth in the natural resource sectors (Hutton, 1994). Nevertheless, the 
fisheries remain a feature of Canada’s traditional, staples basis and a significant employer 
in many coastal communities and in the Atlantic, Pacific and Arctic regions. Even if 
fisheries harvests have declined, Canada’s large extent of coastline and location on key 
migration routes of critical food species such as salmon and cod, ensure that it will have 
an active fisheries policy and will be a major player in international fisheries negotiations 
and accords. 
As in the past (discussed in the following section), the leading export market for 
the Canadian fisheries today remains the United States, with the European Union coming 
in a distance second.3 Other markets include non-EU European countries, Central and 
South America, Japan (which comes rather close to EU numbers), as well as in Asia and 
Africa.  The following charts illustrate the developments of these markets over the past 5 
years (2000-2005), as well as provides a glimpse into earlier developments during the 
1990s (with statistics for 1999, 1995, and 1990).4 The selected commodities referred to 
include seafish and freshwater fish (whole, dressed fresh, frozen, fillets, blocks), fish 
meat, smoked, salted, dried, pickled/cured, and canned fish. It also includes shellfish 
(fresh, frozen and canned), fish livers and roes, shellfish meal and fish oil.5  
 
Domestic Imports of Selected Commodities by Major Market: USA (STATSCAN/DFO, 2006) 
Time period (tonnes) Value ($1000 CAD) $/KG 
Jan-dec 2005 363,245 2,663,239 7,33 
Jan-dec 2004 374,078 2,823,524 7,55 
Jan-dec 2003 375,320 3,007,872 8,01 
Jan-dec 2002 401,279 3,273,261 8,16 
Jan-dec 2001 368,526 3,065,753 8,32 
Jan-dec 2000 345,539 2,899,319 8,39 
Jan-dec 1999 338,524 2,583,531 7,63 
Jan-dec 1995 278,652 1,569,599 5,63 
Jan-dec 1990 362,366 1,411,079 3,89 
 
Domestic Imports of Selected Commodities by Major Market: European Union 
(STATSCAN/DFO, 2006) 
Time period (tonnes) Value ($1000 CAD) $/KG 
Jan-dec 2005 79,148 458,611 5,79 
Jan-dec 2004 79,442 474,388 5,97 
Jan-dec 2003 70,649 455,983 6,45 
Jan-dec 2002 56,426 369,772 6,55 
Jan-dec 2001 59,255 366,169 6,18 
Jan-dec 2000 50,904 329,957 6,48 
Jan-dec 1999 57,432 361,686 6,30 
Jan-dec 1995 43,537 310,233 7,13 
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The quantities of the export commodities were quite high in 1990; in the EU case 
the highest ever in the 15 years between 1990 and 2005. The quantities of fisheries-based 
export commodities dropped significantly after the moratorium on cod in the early 1990s, 
whereby both the US and EU quantities and value declined. However, we can see that 
both quantities and value (of course the value being also dependent upon the price per 
kilo) increased during the latter half of the 1990s and into the new millennium. However, 
these increases in quantity and value were not based on the same species being fished 
over time. Despite increases in groundfish quantities from 2000 to 2005, the cod fisheries 
show a significant decline while the hake, flounder and Greenland turbot show significant 
increases. Pelagic fish such as Atlantic salmon, mackerel and capelin also saw increases 
in catch quantities, thereby increasing the overall value of the fisheries. The shrimp 
fisheries more than doubled in annual quantity over this same 5 year period, with crab 
(including snow/queen and dungeness) also exhibiting discernable increases.6 The 
summary of Canadian commercial catches shows that the quantities fished from 2000 to 
2004 have increased each year (the value of the catches differs somewhat, though not 
radically, based on the market value of the fished products).7 In other words, declining 
stocks have not significantly reduced the quantity fished and the value of the fisheries, as 
declining stocks are being replaced by other stocks.  
Alternatives are being sought, such as through aquaculture. The increase in fish 
production since the mid-1980s has been enormous. Finfish such as Atlantic, Chinook, 
and Coho salmon, and trout, and shellfish such as clams, oysters, mussels, and scallops 
are all a part of the aquaculture industry. In 1986, the aquaculture industry produced 
almost 10,500 tonnes of product; by 2004 it was almost 146,000 tonnes.8 It nevertheless 
accounts for less than half of the total quantity of fish produced each year. We are still 
heavily dependent upon wild freshwater and seafish in the fisheries. But for how long can 
this be sustained? Is (over)fishing other stocks the answer? It seems to be the acceptable 
solution so far – but the solution does not appear to have the health of the oceans, and its 
contents upon which the fisheries depend, in mind. 
The current state of the global fisheries is tenuous. A recent article published in 
Science examines biodiversity loss due to various human impacts on the oceans, 
including exploitation, pollution and habitat destruction.9 Global fisheries collapses have 
been increasing over time, with 29% of the fisheries considered collapsed as of 2003.10 It 
additionally claims that at the rate of eroding diversity, a total fisheries collapse can be 
expected by 2048.11 In species rich ecosystems, the chances of species collapse are 
reduced, and the chances of species recovery are greater, in large part because of the 
diversity of product. In this respect, switching to other stocks can assist the overfished 
stocks to recover. Insofar as this article, which is not the first of its kind (see, for 
example, Pauly, 2003) has been able to demonstrate a crises in our oceans, it does seek to 
offer solutions, by suggesting that sustainable fisheries management, pollution control, 
the creation of marine reserves, and so forth (in other words, restraining overfishing) can 
assist in re-building biodiversity in the oceans ecosystems. To better understand what is 
needed, we need to understand what have been some of the critical factors leading 
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A History of the Canadian Fishery: Trade Policy, Staples Production , and Fisheries 
Industry Development 
The fisheries have experienced a myriad of trade relationships, including the 
truck and barter system (the exchange of commodities) or in forms of exchange through 
money or credit. The truck system, in which fishers exchanged their fish directly for 
goods, usually at company stores, for a long time benefited the merchants who bought the 
fish from the fishers, in that no money exchanged hands and profit margins on traded 
goods in captive markets were very high. The fishers exchanged fish for foodstuffs and 
supplies from the merchant, but the merchant controlled the prices for both, ensuring that 
the fishers were constantly in their debt (Apostle, 1998; Innis 1935). 
This system was kept in place both by the isolated nature of fisheries, but also by 
mercantile policies followed in leading colonial countries, notably Great Britain, which 
insured merchant monopolies by prohibiting competing international players from 
entering colonial markets. Great Britain actively pursued a free trade agenda in the later 
1800s, however, and this agenda was imposed upon its colonies. This, in conjunction 
with the fact that this policy toward the colonies forced the likes of Canada to pursue 
broader trade possibilities (such as the US), set Canada’s course toward a predominantly, 
if not controversial and rocky, free trade direction, beginning with reciprocity. 
The notion of reciprocity or free trade, in British North America was intricately 
linked to the fisheries. Debates as to whether or not Canada should enter a reciprocity 
treaty with the United States in the 1850s centred around, in part, the interests of the 
fisheries.  New Brunswick advocated reciprocity, for example, while other colonies, like 
Nova Scotia wished to pursue alternatives to reciprocity which would enhance  fish 
monopolies (Innis 1935).  Reciprocity entailed a reduction of tariffs between the 
cooperating nations, and although considered a measure of free trade between the 
contracting parties (a first step towards free trade for Canada and the US), it did not mean 
free trade in and of itself since it raised differential duties against outside trading partners 
(Masters 1963). Although the system of trade was still mercantilist, Canada was now 
broadening its trade parameters and reaching out to new markets in the fisheries and other 
sectors. Although not consistent with a unilateral free trade approach, reciprocity featured 
aspects of a liberal free trade regime which, it was hoped, would manifest itself into a 
broader free trade agreement in the future (Masters 1963). 12  In the meantime, however, 
it was the fisheries that ensured that a reciprocity agreement would be signed – the threat 
of eliminating American fishing rights and privileges in Canadian waters was decisive in 
instituting a long term relationship between the two neighbouring countries in relation to 
their successful and unsuccessful pursuits for freer trade. 
After 1866 Canada’s National Policy was to increase foreign (particularly the 
US) capital in the creation of ‘branch plants’, forcing even greater reliance on staple 
resources for export earnings (Clement 1999) .  The fisheries were engaged in a “Fordist” 
program of industrialization as modern factories (canneries) using indigenous and 
imported labour began to flourish on both the Atlantic and Pacific costs, as well as upon 
the Great lakes and the large freshwater lakes of the interior of the country. As in other 
industries, “capital began to displace labour in importance and large-scale to succeed 
individual production" (Innis 1935 p. 282).  The Fordist model demanded a stabilized 
supply of fish to canneries, and therefore encouraged a constant and continuous flow of 
fish to market, replacing or augmenting previously seasonal fisheries with new or 
expanded ones. This, in turn, led to the development of greater and greater technological 
reliance, particularly in the development of mechanized steam and oil-driven trawlers 
(Apostle 1998).   
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This new large-scale, permanent, capital intensive fishery required secure, 
permaent access to international markets and in 1911 Canada negotiated another free 
trade agreement with the US, which covered a variety of natural resource products, 
including fish. Although the negotiating Canadian government lost the 1911 election and 
the treay was never proclaimed, exports to the US continued to rise as that country’s 
population increased dramatically during the pre- and post WWI period (Innis 1935).   
When faced with protectionist pressures and punitive import tariffs in the US in 
the 1930s, Canada pursued a tariff reduction direction, both multilaterally or bilaterally, 
with the US (Clement 1999).  Newfoundland, prior to its entry into Confederation in 
1949, also attempted various measures to offset foreign control of its fisheries and its 
reliance on protected foreign markets. The cooperative program developed in 1947 
through the Newfoundland Associated Fish Exports Limited (NAFEL), for example, 
complemented the work of the Newfoundland Fisheries board in attempting to control the 
export of salt fish (cod) through a monopoly or marketing cooperative. 13   
In the 1950s, the branch plant form of industrial organization, linking Canada to 
larger, foreign-owned companies (predominantly in the USA), took hold in 
Newfoundland, and in the Canadian fisheries industry overall.14  The Canadian 
government encouraged Fordist development through private enterprise, focused on the 
expanding frozen (as opposed to salted) fish market. It did not recognize a conflict with 
stabilizing supply, requiring extensive and continuous fishing with trawler technology, 
which although employing les than 10% of fishers could match and increase current 
catches, as “there was room for expansion in the fisheries, as the potential of groundfish 
stocks was not fully utilized, and, in any case, Canadian fisherman took less than 7 
percent of total codfish catches off the eastern shores” (Apostle 1998 p. 76)  The 
industrialization program employed by the Canadian government continuously called for 
“a longer fishing season and more fishing effort.” 
 Ultimately Canada and the United States, Canada’s largest trading partner, have 
to date engaged in 7 fisheries agreements (see Table 1 below): 
TABLE 1 – Canada-US Fishing Agreements 
Agreement between the UK and the USA respecting the North Atlantic Fisheries (Signed July 20, 1912, In Force Nov. 
15, 1912). CUS 456. 
Convention for the extension of Port Privileges to Halibut Fishing Vessels on the Pacific Coasts of the USA and Canada 
(Signed March 24, 1950, In Force July 13, 1950). CTS 1950/5. 
Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries (Signed Sept. 10, 1954, In Force Oct. 11, 1955). CTS 1955/19. Amended May 19, 
1967. CTS 1967/10. 
Convention for Preservation of the Halibut Fishery of the Northern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea (Signed March 2, 
1953, In Force Oct. 28, 1953). CTS 1953/14. Amended March 29, 1979 and October 15, 1980. CTS 1979/27 and 
1980/44 
Treaty on Pacific Coast Albacore Tuna Vessels and Port Privileges (Signed May 26, 1981, In Force July 29, 1981). CTS 
1981/19. 
Pacific Salmon Treaty (Signed Jan. 28, 1985, Amended by Exchange of Notes May 5 and June 12, 1986, and In Force 
March 27, 1987). CTS 1985/7. Amended by Exchange of Notes Oct. 18, 1989. CTS 1989/41. Exchange of Notes 
constituting an Agreement amending Annexes I and IV of the Treaty concerning the Pacific Salmon, signed in Ottawa 
on January 28, 1985, as amended (with annexes). (Signed and In Force February 3, 1995). CTS 1995/39. Agreement on 
the Establishment of a Mediation Procedure regarding the Pacific Salmon Treaty. (Signed and In Force September 11, 
1995). CTS 1995/13. 
Agreement on Fisheries Enforcement (Signed Sept. 26, 1990, In Force Dec. 16, 1991). CTS 1991/36. 
Source: Canadian Embassy, Washington, D.C., Treaties and Agreements in Force between Canada and the United 
States, Government of Canada, internet. Available at: http://www.canadianembassy.org/government/treaties-en.asp#21 
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Conflict Between Sustainability and Markets in A Mature Staples Industry 
The supply-demand relationship which was a continuing feature of Canada’s 
staple fisheries industries had particular significance with regard to the phenomenon of 
the overexploitation of the fisheries, or overfishing in the mature fisheries industry in the 
last quarter of the 20th century. 15 Demand for fish continues to exceed supply, and thus 
the incentive to extract as much resource as possible, or to overfish, does not cease. 
Overexploitation is further exacerbated by over capacity in the harvesting sector, or too 
many fishing boats chasing too few fish which in turn was exacerbated by government 
subsidization of the fisheries industry in the 1950s and 1960s (Delgado). Subsidies, 
meaning the internal, national policies of fishing nations, have become a significant part 
of international fisheries discussions, as they are blamed in large part for the problems of 
overfishing and depleted stocks. 
Subsidies occur ‘when the government through its actions enables producers of 
goods and services to avoid full payment for the factors of production and/or to behave 
differently in the marketplace than they would otherwise.” (Schrank and Keithly 1999, p. 
153)   Subsidies are not necessarily evil in their own right, as many exist with the purpose 
of promoting “the pre-eminent social goal of improving human safety.” (p. 1554)  
However, some subsidies no longer promote this goal, or even detract from it, especially 
with regard to the fishing industry whereby subsidization during earlier eras of 
undercapacity in harvesting technology may have served a greater social purpose, but 
now contributes to overcapacity and to the destruction of the fish stocks ,therefore 
reducing social, economic, and ecological security.16 Accordingly, most current proposals 
and actions that attempt to promote fish stock recovery and prevent further ecosystem 
damage, both of which are critical to a sustainable fishery,  involve the elimination of all 
kinds of government subsidies to fishers and fish companies and the implementation of 
conservation policies such as boat buybacks, quotas, seasonal limits on catches and 
outright fishing moratoriums.  
Although Canada has managed to sustain, and even increase, its overall 
fish/seafood volumes (exports in 1998 were at their highest value thus far), this has been 
entirely dependent upon new sources of product, rather than from the traditional stocks 
that previously defined the Canadian fisheries market.  Cod stocks continue to be 
dangerously low, with Pacific salmon stocks, Coho in particular, following close on the 
heels of the cod if not surpassing it with regard to high risk of extinction. Overcapacity in 
the processing sector has equally placed undue pressure on the fish stocks, with the result 
that the government of Canada is presently pursuing initiatives to re-orient the focus of 
the processing sector, including value-added secondary processing, aquaculture, and 
‘rationalization’ of the industry.  However, pressure to export fish products continues to 
mount, as Canada is the number one supplier of seafood to the US market: "[t]he United 
States is the second largest importer of fish products in the world, after Japan," (Anania 
1994, p. 518)  and the European Union opened its tariff rate quotas on cooked and peeled 
shrimp from Canada, allowing greater export potential. Dire though the Canadian fishing 
industry is, it remains the largest foreign supplier of seafood to the US, accounting for 
67% of total Canadian fish exports.  It additionally supplies over 100 countries around 
the world.  What Canada imports, largely from the US, is turned around into value-added 
product and re-exported primarily to the US market.   
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An assessment of the overall situation of the fishery in this new era based on 
financial or trade figures alone, however, can be misleading. As new fish stocks replace 
the old exhausted ones this gives the impression of a financially healthy, fisheries 
industry while it is not, in fact, biologically sustainable. Thus, for example, the reports 
issued by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 2001 
showed Canada’s fisheries to be in financially good stead due to an increased focus on 
high-valued crustaceans such as crab and lobster. The review however acknowledged the 
low volume of landings in most other species for the Canadian fishing industry as a 
whole in relation to historical levels (increased crustacean landings and an improvement 
in aquaculture secured Canada a record overall volume in 1999 of 1.1 million tonnes, or 
CAD 1.9 billion in value (OECD 2001)  It praised the Canadian government efforts to 
increase conservation through bilateral and multilateral fishing agreements such as the 
Pacific Salmon Treaty and the International Plan of Action (IPOA) adopted by the UN 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), but Canada nonetheless appears to be 
invigorating these efforts from a deficit position.  Historically low levels of Canada’s 
significant fish stocks such as cod and salmon make the conservational efforts appear too 
little too late, as the industry shifts its reliance onto currently thriving stocks such as 
crustaceans. 
 
Overfishing, Conservation Efforts and International  Agreements in the Modern 
Era 
In general it can be said that the Canadian fishing industry was subject to market 
forces, without much in the way of government protection or substantial policy outside of 
trade agreements, to the greater extent of its history until government subsidies promoted 
overcapacity and overharvesting in the era following WWII. After 1975, however, new 
‘buffering’ strategies were employed in the interest of conserving fish resources through 
fisheries management strategies, which became increasingly relevant, although 
recognized far too late where the cod fishery was concerned, as the fight against over-
fishing had begun. 
Trade agreements, and in some general respects the NAFTA, apply to the 
fisheries primarily with regard to the maintenance of international fisheries laws such as 
the 200 mile Extended Economic Zone, and in later agreements, conservation efforts.17 
Their impacts, both in earlier agreements as well as more recent, have had a significant 
effect on the development of the fisheries industry. These agreements attempt to balance 
the needs of trade and economic security with the needs of conservation and 
environmental security. The NAFTA and WTO (and their predecessors the CUSFTA and 
GATT) have had a substantial impacts on the directions the fisheries have taken. 18 By 
1998, the United States had 83% of Canada’s merchandise exports, including primary 
products.19 Primary products, in addition, still accounted for almost one third of 
Canada’s merchandise exports, illustrating yet again its heavy dependency upon natural 
resources.20 Due primarily to the NAFTA, Canada’s tariffs have all but been eliminated 
between it and the US. However, Canada has continued to impose high tariffs towards 
other countries, particularly those in the developing world which would be considered to 
have a ‘comparative advantage’ over Canada, especially in the area of food products.21 
Due to this very close relationship with the United States, fostered by CUSFTA 
and NAFTA, some tension is developing with regard to Canada’s additional 
commitments to other international treaty regimes. With 90% of its trade taking place 
within the NAFTA, Canada’s commitments are not global but regional And many 
Canadian trade actions are motivated by conditions in the United States. As much as US 
trade policy dictates the moves of Canadian trade activities, regional trade agreements 
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such as CUSFTA and NAFTA rely upon already established regulations in the GATT 
and WTO.  
The GATT Article XX has been used often as the basis for in decisions 
pertaining to conservation actions taken on either behalf of the Canadian or American 
fisheries. Although not specifically mentioning the environment, this article has been 
most often relevant to these decisions is the trade versus conservation arguments, in 
particular ‘relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures 
are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or 
consumption.’22 Insofar as the environment would be relevant, the GATT Article XX 
states that:  
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries 
where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, 
nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by 
any contracting party of measures: 
. . .(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
. . .(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such 
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or 
consumption; . . . 
 
Although Article XX can apply to fish products, they are not specifically dealt 
with in the GATT, and were not addressed during the Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Agriculture. Fish products, although having the highest share of international trade for 
food, are treated as non-agricultural and are  considered in kind with industrial 
products.23  
Under the GATT and WTO numerous cases have been heard which try to justify 
the necessity of raising barriers to trade on the basis of environmental concerns, the vast 
majority of which were ruled to be inapplicable and therefore the measures could not be 
maintained (Swenarchuk 2000). John Kirton, Alan Rugman and Julie Soloway review a 
number of fisheries-related disputes between Canada and the United States to illustrate 
the impact of trade agreements upon the fisheries industry (Rugman and Kirton 1999). 
For example, in 1979 Canada was subject to a US embargo preventing the export of tuna 
and tuna products from Canada, and the GATT ruling concluded that although the US 
action could be understood as a measure of conservation of an exhaustible resource,  it 
did not apply the same restrictions to domestic producers and therefore the US embargo 
was impermissible. Resource conservation was again raised in 1988 when Canada 
claimed it needed to restrict the export of unprocessed herring and sockeye salmon – the 
GATT ruled against Canada under Article XX as the restriction was not applied to both 
foreign and domestic producers and therefore only penalized the US. Shortly thereafter, 
Canadian fisheries authorities complied with the GATT ruling and lifted the restrictions 
on herring and sockeye salmon, but instead imposed a mandatory Canadian landing 
requirement on five species of salmon for the purpose of conservation, allowing for 
biological samples as each catch was landed. The US complained, stating that forced 
Canadian landings restricted exports and forced fish to be processed in Canada as the 
wait was too long for the fish to enter the US. As the CUSFTA was recently negotiated, 
the US chose to mediate this dispute using the FTA (although the same regulations would 
apply given the fact that the FTA incorporated these provisions of the GATT). On two 
counts the Canadian measure was deemed illegal – first that the measure was not just a 
domestic measure but instead negatively affected and restricted trade with the US, and 
second that this could not be construed as a conservation measure as  ‘[t]he panel 
concluded that this was not the case, since it was highly unlikely that Canada would have 
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imposed the same requirements “if its own nationals had to bear the actual costs of the 
measure”’   
In 1990 it was Canada’s turn to wage a complaint against US fisheries practices 
when the US restricted lobster exports from Canada on the basis of size. This measure 
was instituted on the basis of conservation in that it would allow US lobster to mature to 
a greater size before being caught. Canada argued that this discriminated against Canada 
since lobster in the colder Canadian waters mature at a smaller size that those in US 
waters. The US countered that lobster was treated the same regardless of origin (domestic 
and foreign lobster had to meet the same standards), and the FTA panel, split on the 
decision (3-2), upheld the US action stating that it was ‘“primarily aimed” at the 
conservation of US lobsters.’   
Kirton et. Als   concluded  that: 
One of the most striking findings is how the outcome of issues over 
environmental regulatory protectionism have benefited the United States and its firms. Of 
the 50 cases effectively resolved, the United States has won 29, Canada 8, and Mexico 7, 
while 8 have been resolved to the mutual benefit of two or three of the North American 
partners. Such a pattern, with the United States prevailing in 58 per cent of the cases, 
would appear to be a further testament to the realist presupposition that in this bargaining 
domain as in so many others, the United States with its overwhelmingly superior power, 
is bound to prevail (Rugman and Kirton p. 229).   
 
Conclusion: Canadian Fisheries as a Declining Mature Staples Industry 
Without question, Canadian domstic policy has had an influence on the 
development of the fisheries staple industry – from its National Policy to its subsidization 
of both fishers and, more recently its effort to conserve of fish stocks. In this respect 
Laxer is correct in allocating “blame” for the current dire status of the fisheries industry 
where it is, in part, due: on the Canadian government itself. However, it is also the case 
that trade liberalization, from the pressures exerted early on by the colonizing country of 
Britain, to the current dependency upon the US market for fish exports, has played an 
enormous role on the development, if not devastation of the industry.  
In this respect the Canadian government could have done much more in the way 
of first recognizing the severity of fish stock depletion as well as fostering a sustainable 
fisheries industry that met the needs of conservation and fisher communities. However, 
the Canadian fisheries have been exposed to a long-term and extensive process of 
liberalization since the decline of mercantilism in the fishing industry in the 1840s. 
Fisheries and Free trade agreements, manifested currently through the likes of the FTA, 
NAFTA and WTO have institutionalized a mature staples industry and limit its ability to 
change. Fisheries management in Canada has largely reflected a mature staples view of 
increased and enhanced commodity production over most of the period of the fisheries 
history, only beginning to take a more scientific approach to fisheries management in the 
late 20th century when it became more than apparent that the fisheries were in trouble due 
to rapidly declining stocks. .  
The present relationship between the Canadian fishing industry and community, 
and trade liberalization as exemplified by the NAFTA and WTO reflects the antagonisms 
and contradictions apparent in a too-late recognition that largely unfettered trade in the 
fishing sector leads to depleted stocks and threatened ecosystems. The Canadian 
government has turned to a more conservationist fisheries management practice, but must 
now fight for the right to do so within the confines of NAFTA and the WTO. The 
Canadian government, and the Department of Fisheries and Oceans in particular, will 
more than likely defer to science as their guide in determining fisheries policy, rather 
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than trade agreements. When science, however, has been and continues to be as imperfect 
as it is in providing accurate measures of fish stocks and environmental conditions, it 
becomes clear that trade agreements play a greater role than DFO might want to 
anticipate. Unless it can be ‘scientifically’ substantiated that a DFO measure which has 
the appearance of limiting or restricting trade is sincerely a measure intended for 
conservation, the trade agreements entered into by Canada will prevail and curtail such 
‘protective’ measures. It goes without saying that some such measures are in fact 
disguised (sometimes well, sometimes less so) tactics to protect domestic fishers and 
fisheries, and, s the examples of FTA and GATT rulings illustrate, under existing trade 
agreements a panel has to ‘judge’ on the basis of impressions whether conservation or 
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1 This is evidenced by the attention garnered at the March 2002 UNEP Workshop 
on the Impacts of Trade-Related Policies on Fisheries and Measures Required for their 
Sustainable Management, the November 2001 WTO Ministerial Conference held in 
Doha, the OECD Review of Fisheries published every two years, as well as the 
continuing efforts of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) 
to bring fisheries issues to light. 
2 World Trade Organization, available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm, internet. 
3 It is possible to argue that the category “other countries”, which combines 54  
nations from Africa, Asia and the Pacific region, is the next largest “major market” as its 
numbers sometimes exceeds that of the EU – however, the EU can be interpreted as a 
single unit to a certain degree, and on that basis it’s significance outweighs that of the 
catch-all category of “other countries”. See: http://www.dfo-
mpo.gc.ca/communic/statistics/trade/canadian_trade/export_data/xmkt06_e.htm  
4 These tables are based on data from the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, 
available at: http://www.dfo-
mpo.gc.ca/communic/statistics/trade/canadian_trade/export_data/index_e.htm 
5 See the list of product groups:  http://www.dfo-
mpo.gc.ca/communic/statistics/trade/canadian_trade/export_data/xprd05_e.htm 
 





8 See the statistics on aquaculture at DFO: http://www.dfo-
mpo.gc.ca/communic/statistics/aqua/index_e.htm  
9 Worm, Boris, et.al (November 2006). ”Impacts of Biodiversity Loss on Ocean 
Ecosystem Services” Science, vol.314: 787-790. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12  Establishing a ‘most favoured nation’ principle to be extended to other 
trading partners was one such hope. 
13 The initiative failed in the 1950s, not long after its creation, in large part due 
to lack of “support in the political establishment.”Apostle 1998, 75. 
14 Note that Newfoundland joined the Canadian Confederation in 1949, and was 
therefore subject to Canadian political interests as opposed to just Newfoundland 
interests. 
15 The U.S. National Research Council defines overfishing as: “fishing at an 
intensity great enough to reduce fish populations below the size at which they would 
provide the maximum long term sustainable yield or great enough to prevent their 
returning to that size (Pauly and MacLean 2003)127n. 
16 Perhaps one of the most controversial moves by the Canadian government in 
the fishing sector was the implementation of the Unemployment Insurance program in the 
fishing industry, allowing fishers to collect stamps toward UI benefit entitlement. This 
program had the effect of reducing the fishing season as fishers stopped as soon as they 
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had enough stamps, extended the salted fish production (as this work was counted 
towards the accumulation of stamps), 
17 . NAFTA does not include specifics about the fisheries, and therefore is only 
applicable in indirect ways such that the fisheries are an integral part of Canada’s exports. 
According to the FAO, the NAFTA does not pay any specific attention to fish and fish 
products, and additionally does not cooperate with the FAO on fisheries matters. As well, 
[a]t this time, there are no provisions in the GATT or NAFTA to equalize foreign access 
to coastal fishing.’ (Wathen, 1996: 83). However, NAFTA cannot be ignored due to its 
pre-eminence in the Canada-US trade relationship. As noted by Christopher L. Delgado 
et.al, institutional developments that apply to sectors outside of the fisheries have great 
implications for the fisheries nevertheless. 
18 North American Free Trade Agreement, Art.103. The NAFTA, a trade 
agreement established between Canada, the United States and Mexico, was implemented 
in 1994, integrating and expanding the 1989 CUSFTA (Canada-United States Free Trade 
Agreement) with a new agreement with Mexico. The NAFTA affirmed the rights and 
obligations all parties held to the General Agreement on Tarrifs and Trade (GATT) by 
1994, but stated that any inconsistency between other agreements and the NAFTA would 
defer to the NAFTA unless otherwise specified in the NAFTA. 




22World Trade Organization, Legal Texts: General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, internet. Available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_02_e.htm 
23 Multilateral Trade Negotiations on Agriculture: A Resource Manual. 
Agreement on Agriculture Rome: FAO, 2000), internet. Available at: 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/x7353e/X7353e11.htm.  
